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Youth unemployment has increased over the past two decades in abso- 
lute terms relative to prime-age male unemployment. More recently the 
unemployment rates for most youth groups have begun to level off and 
move in parallel with prime-age male unemployment rates. This is espe- 
cially true for white males. 
Explaining these developments in a statistical sense presents major 
problems. First, the underlying developments appear to be due to eco- 
nomic-demographic swings of  intermediate-run  duration.  Hence  the 
length of the time series data base is woefully short. Second, many of the 
most interesting and potentially important explanatory variables, such as 
government policy variables, present major measurement problems. 
Our view stresses the role of  “cohort overcrowding,” which results 
from an imbalance between younger and older workers. The model is 
based on two central assumptions. The first is that younger and older 
workers are imperfect substitutes for each other. The main difference 
between them reflects their relative amounts of  specific training. Given 
the “putty-clay’’ nature of physical and human capital and the transient 
nature of  the cohort bulge, the economy’s adjustment process may be 
slow and incomplete.  In the short run, elasticities of  substitution are 
relatively low so that large relative wage adjustments can occur. 
The second is that aspiration levels or desired standards of  living are 
formed when the younger workers are living with their parents. This is an 
endogenous taste or habit formation model in which past living standards 
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influence current  desired  standards.  In  addition, young  families are 
assumed to treat their desired standard of living as a necessity. Hence, in 
the event of  lower wage levels, families will increase the number of 
workers and/or hours worked. The increase in labor force participation 
rates of the young workers can thus be traced directly to the population 
demographics. In addition, the induced change in participation  rates 
serves to aggravate the existing problem of oversupply of younger work- 
ers, thus further driving down relative wages. 
As  relative  wages  fall for the oversized cohort,  institutional  con- 
straints, such as government transfer programs, minimum wage levels, 
etc., become relevant and cause an increase in unemployment rates as 
well as or instead of the increase in participation rates. If the unemploy- 
ment effects are large enough, employment may actually decline. 
Although some previous studies  have attempted to isolate the effects of 
government programs, for example of  minimum wage legislation and 
manpower programs, data problems make this task almost impossible. 
Besides the data problems, there are important conceptual problems as 
well. The government’s social welfare package, whether intentional or 
not, is an integrated program. The parameters of  the various programs 
tend to change together reflecting common political pressures. An exam- 
ple is the parallel increase in minimum wage coverage and government 
transfer payments (in relative terms) during the late 1960s. Since almost 
all studies concentrate on one government program at a time, they miss 
these crucial interrelationships and hence attribute too much to the single 
program under study. We also find that  “relative wages” have some 
explanatory power, but cannot separate minimum wage from govern- 
ment transfer effects. In addition, attempts to include direct job creation 
effects invariably yield the wrong sign. 
Our empirical work focuses on two approaches. The first attempts to 
measure unemployment  in different  ways by  altering the numerator 
and/or the denominator of the unemployment rate term. For example, 
we argue that the variable which is closest to the traditional measure of 
unemployment would give school attendence equal status with employ- 
ment. Hence the numerator would exclude those who were unemployed 
and whose primary activity was school and the denominator would in- 
clude all of those who were in school. The second approach focuses on 
disaggregating youth activities into four categories: unemployment, em- 
ployment, school, and a residual (all as a ratio to the population) for each 
of the age-sex-race groups. Equations are then estimated using the same 
explanatory variables and adding the constraint that the four ratios sum 
to unity. 
Since black males pose a particular problem, we concentrate somewhat 
on the deterioration in the unemployment and employment ratios of this 
group relative to other youth groups. Why should this group suffer a 157  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
deterioration in labor market position relative to other youth groups, 
including black females? 
6.1  The Basic Model of Cohort Overcrowding 
6.1.1  The Underlying Workings of  the Model 
In some earlier work by the authors and others, the youth unemploy- 
ment  problem  was explained in  the context  of  a broader  economic- 
demographic model.’ The basis of the model is a “cohort overcrowding” 
effect which results from an imbalance between younger and older work- 
ers. We shall utilize this approach to explore the developments in youth 
unemployment over the past fifteen years. It was during this period that 
the baby boom cohort was passing through the 16-24  age category. 
This type of model can generate cyclical swings of intermediate length 
in unemployment rates. A fertility increase in generation t causes a large 
cohort of  entry level workers in  t + 1. In the short run, elasticities of 
substitution are relatively low so that large relative wage adjustments 
occur. This deterioration in the income potential of young people causes 
a decline in fertility and family formation rates and an increase in the 
labor force participation  rates of  secondary workers. The increase in 
young workers’ labor force participation rates can thus be traced directly 
to the population demographics.  In addition, the induced change in 
participation rates serves to aggravate the existing oversupply problem of 
younger workers.* 
As relative wages fall for the oversized cohort, institutional constraints 
become relevant and cause an increase in unemployment rates as well as 
or instead of  the increase in participation rates. If  the unemployment 
effects are large enough, employment may actually decline. 
The institutional constraints that cause unemployment can exist on 
both the demand and supply sides of  the market. For example, since 
minimum wage levels are informally indexed on average economy-wide 
wages, a decline in the relative wage for youths may cause the market 
clearing wage to fall below the minimum wage. Youths, of course, form a 
heterogeneous skill group with a wage distribution rather than a single 
wage. The decline of  the relative wage, in this case, causes an adverse 
shift in the distribution of  wages. That is, the probability of  any youth 
having a skill and associated wage level that falls below the minimum 
wage is increased by the demographic overcrowding. 
On the supply side, a different institutional factor is operating but with 
a similar potential result. In both neoclassical labor supply literature as 
well as institutional literature, workers are viewed as having a reservation 
wage; when market wages are below that reservation wage, individuals 
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trade-off between hours of work and wage rates. It is only at the corner of 
the indifference map that the wage rate is sufficiently low so that indi- 
viduals will offer  zero hours of work. The likelihood of  a corner solution 
is increased by the existence of public assistance and government trans- 
fers in general. These programs have high implicit tax rates. Indeed, it is 
generally acknowledged that the eligible poverty population for these 
programs face higher implicit marginal tax rates than do the wealthiest 
individuals. The result of  these programs is to considerably flatten the 
budget con~traint.~ 
The likelihood of  a corner solution is also determined by the mecha- 
nism through which individuals form their reservation wage. Specifically, 
individuals’ attitudes toward  an  acceptable  wage  are determined by 
wages paid elsewhere in the economy. Of particular importance in de- 
fining the indifference map or “taste” for work is the minimum income 
level dictated by the government social welfare programs and minimum 
wage laws. These programs signal what constitutes an acceptable mini- 
mum wage to the voting public and policymakers. That is, government 
programs almost certainly influence the shape of the indifference map as 
they alter the budget constraint. A liberalization of  benefits shifts both 
the indifference map and the budget constraint toward the corner solu- 
tion of  zero 
It should be noted that the fluctuations in unemployment discussed in 
this model are solely related to changes in the equilibrium rate of unem- 
ployment.  Cyclical unemployment may be positive or negative in the 
short run, but the demographic cycle outlined above is an intermediate 
swing and averages out the peaks and troughs of the short-run business 
cycle. 
6.1.2  A Simple Expositional Model5 
The major factors that we use in our empirical work can be captured in 
a simple expositional model. The model is oriented toward the specific 
empirical factors involved in the demographic shift. To start, assume a 
production function that recognizes two different categories of  labor: 
older workers who have accumulated specific training (LA)  and younger 
workers who lack such training (LB).  For our purposes we can view LA  as 
skilled workers and LB  as unskilled workers. In the long run, the produc- 
tion function can be written as: 
(1)  X”  =p  (LA‘, LB”, K) 
where K is the capital stock, Xis the level of output, and the superscripts 
refers to supply. In the short run, there appear to be significant lags in 
achieving desired absolute and relative levels of  factor inputs. The lags 
may arise for a number of reasons including adjustment and expectional 
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especially relevant to the capital input. If  the capital stock is “putty-clay,’’ 
the input coefficients are fixed as part of  the capital endowment. These 
coefficients  may vary for different vintages but, to the extent that they are 
empirically important, they impart a difficulty in  substituting against 
scarce factors in the short run. 
For our purposes, aggregate demand can be viewed as being controlled 
by monetary (M)  and fiscal (F)  policies, subject to unanticipated changes 
in demand from the private sector (Xo): 
(2) 
The derived demand for labor is constrained by either the level of  the 
demand for or supply of  output X  and by relative factor prices. For B 
workers, the relevant own wage is either the minimum wage (MW) or a 
market wage, whichever is higher. 
The labor supply for both LA  and LB  is a function of the population in 
each cohort and the factors that determined the labor force participation 
rates.  For A  workers, we  assume that  the  participation  rate  (rA)  is 
constant in the short run. Abstracting from influences such as school 
enrollment and fertility, the main forces determining participation for B 
workers are the market wage rates for these workers (WB),  the govern- 
ment transfer payments for being unemployed (Tg),  the effective mini- 
mum  wage  (MW), and  some  unspecified trend  factors that  capture 
changes in lifestyle. That is, 
(3) 
Xd  =fd (M,  F, X,) 
LAs = LAs (rA,  POPA) 
and 
(4)  LBs’  = LBs’  (POP,,  TREND, g {WB, Tg,  MW). 
The relationship  between  W, and  Tg determines the cost of  being 
unemployed. The level of  government transfers depends upon unem- 
ployment compensation and public assistance. The supply of  labor rel- 
evant to the production function, denoted LBs, is 
(5) 
That is, we distinguish between an observed labor supply, and LBs’, 
and an effective labor supply, LBs, which is available for employment. 
The discrepancy, measured by  the g  function, is a type of  structural 
unemployment  .6 
Equations (1) through (5) indicate a number of reasons for unemploy- 
ment. The most obvious is cyclical unemployment which results from 
xS>xd. In addition, unemployment will vary with (1) the distribution of 
the labor force between A and B workers, (2) the cost of  being unem- 
ployed  and minimum wage effectiveness, and (3) the bottlenecks  of 
either skilled workers or capital. Over the longer run, when coefficients 
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of production are more flexible, bottlenecks gradually lose their impor- 
tance as a cause of unemployment. On the other hand, traditional wage 
equations indicate  another source of  unemployment.  As bottlenecks 
loosen, relative wages must adjust if the surplus of  B workers is to be 
absorbed. The evidence suggests, however, that the adjustment is very 
imperfect. Minimum wages prevent employers from moving down their 
demand curve for B workers and/or altering the reservation wage of  B 
workers. In addition, government transfer programs help to maintain a 
high reservation wage (relative to their market wage) for the unskilled 
workers. These latter workers are in the labor force, but are not willing or 
able to work at the market clearing wage. 
6.2  The Reduced Form Unemployment Equation 
6.2.1  Basic Considerations 
Estimating an unemployment function can be done in several ways 
given the basic building blocks of  labor supply and employment func- 
tions. For our purposes it is useful to start by estimating a reduced form 
relative unemployment equation. In section 6.4 we shall estimate both 
unemployment and employment functions. In this case the unemploy- 
ment equations serve the role of a labor supply equation. This approach is 
compatible with the theory outlined above and the fact that prime-age 
male unemployment is an independent variable. Specifically,  it highlights 
our view that youth unemployment is largely structural in nature and 
dominated by fluctuations on the supply rather than demand side of the 
market. For reasons associated with government policy and the dynamics 
of the overcrowding model, supply side shifts do not induce adjustments 
in labor demand. 
A reduced form relative unemployment equation can be obtained from 
equation (5) with the additional assumption that fluctuations in LBs’  are 
captured  by  a cyclical  aggregate demand  variable.  For  most  of  our 
calculations, we used the prime-age male unemployment rate.’ 
A large number of  alternative proxies were attempted for the govern- 
ment policy variables. None were particularly satisfactory because of 
measurement errors; essentially, most of  the data were simply not col- 
lected. Our various attempts at representing policy impact are described 
below. No single policy variable provided the best fit among the eighteen 
age-sex-race groups. Rather than use different policy variables in each 
equation, we adopted a compromise variable that performed as well as 
the others but  could be viewed  as representing  several effects. The 
unemployment rate equations for the various age-sex groups are esti- 
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(6) 
+  a4 In  (WIMW)  +  as (In (AFIPOP))  or TREND 
where {Si}  is a vector of seasonal dummies, RPy is the proportion of the 
civilian population aged 16 to 24 to the population aged 16 + ,  AF/POPis 
the militaqdpopulation ratio (added to the male equations), and TREND 
is a time trend (added to the female equations). 
The RPy variable  represents the cohort overcrowding referred  to 
above. Several different specifications of  the RPy variable were tried, 
varying the treatment of  the military, individuals over 65 years of  age, 
and defining youth from the ages of  16 to 34. The results were largely 
unchanged. Given this inability to differentiate empirically, the choice of 
the RPy variable was dictated by usage in earlier studies. It is important 
to note that this cohort variable assumes that young workers are substi- 
tutes for one another and define a distinct labor input. Needless to say, 
any age division of the labor market into two distinct components has to 
be arbitrary. The difference between a 24 and a 25 year old is not large. 
On the other hand, labor market  attachment, employment patterns, 
unemployment rates, etc., differ considerably for a 20 year old compared 
with a 30 year old. 
Some recent studies have used separate supply or cohort variables 
(denoted RPy,) for each of the youth age-sex groups.8  For example, the 
black male population aged 18-19  as a percentage of the population aged 
16 + would be used to explain unemployment of the age-sex-race group. 
Our view is that this is too limiting a view of  the degree of  substitution 
across inputs. Labor.market behavior over the past two decades shows 
more  similarities than  differences across youth  age-sex-race groups. 
Where the RPyi variable has been successful, it was only capturing the 
worsening unemployment  position  of  black youths relative  to white 
 youth^.^ As will be discussed below, however, black youths are not doing 
worse than comparable white groups by all economic yardsticks. Black 
school enrollment rates and relative wages, for example, show significant 
relative improvement. This suggests that RPyi will not provide a consis- 
tent answer to the changing white-black differential. 
6.2.2  The Government Policy Variable 
Although a properly specified unemployment equation should contain 
separate variables to represent transfer payments, direct job creation, 
and minimum wages, data and conceptual problems made this impossi- 
ble. After considerable but largely unsuccessful experimentation with 
different proxies for the various programs, the actual government vari- 
able utilized in the equations is a “compromise variable” of  the form 
WIMW where W is the average hourly earnings of workers 16-24 years of 
age and MW is the minimum wage.’O 
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Measurement problems are complicated by  the fact that the social 
legislation programs including transfers, minimum wages, and direct job 
creation are not  made independently  of  each  other. That is,  policy 
innovations in one program are likely to be reflected in others. Basically, 
political and social pressures do not become concentrated in one area. 
Rather, as was clearly the case during the 1960s and 1970s,  the forces that 
can yield changes in  one policy area are also likely to cause similar 
changes in other areas. 
Most of  the literature dealing with federal welfare initiatives investi- 
gates only one program at a time. There are studies on minimum wages, 
public  assistance,  direct  job creation,  etc., but  few of  these studies 
attempt to integrate the direct labor market impact of  that single study 
into the overall package of  programs. The limited range of  individual 
studies is easily explainable given the data problems for each single study. 
The problem, however, in evaluating the overall effect of  the various 
government programs on unemployment is that the programs interact. 
The sum of the impacts of the individual studies does not equal the overall 
effect of  the variety of programs evaluated together." 
The data problems are due to the fact that the major change in the 
minimum wage is the change in coverage in 1967. Until the 1978 law, 
however, little other meaningful variation in that variable is  evident. 
Many of the increases in coverage did not affect low wage workers and 
the staggered catch-up increase in the minimum wage created a saw-tooth 
pattern in the data with, if  anything, a slightly declining trend of the MW 
relative to W.  That is, the time series minimum wage variable is largely a 
spike in 1967. This, of course, is difficult enough to represent using time 
series data. Suppose, however, as is likely, that firms adjusted with a lag 
to this sweeping change in coverage. One possibility is an exponential 
declining distributed lag response. Depending upon the speed of  decay, 
this would move the mean of the response outward in time, probably to 
1968 or 1969. Alternatively, firms may have responded very slowly at 
first. This may have included low levels of  compliance or incomplete 
compliance in the year immediately after 1967. With a compliance lag 
and an employment response lag conditional on compliance, the distrib- 
uted lag structure could resemble a parabola with a mean lag into 1970 or 
beyond. 
Given these possible time profiles for WIMW, and the difficulty of 
isolating the best fit in the various equations, it is possible for WIMW to 
move in near precision with transfer, supply-side variables. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, this multicollinearity may be a conceptual as well as a 
data problem. To the extent that individuals  form their reservation wages 
as a function of MW and transfer payments are adjusted to conform to  the 
same underlying inflation and real income changes effects, the MW 
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extent that the minimum wage helps to determine the reservation wage of 
low wage workers, the greater the difficulty in differentiating supply and 
demand effects.12 
6.2.3  Empirical Results for the 
Reduced Form Unemployment Equation 
Given a lack of agreement or data on the control variables, especially 
government policy variables, to be introduced into the unemployment 
equation, it is useful to start with the simplest equation. Shown in table 
6.1, this equation only includes RPy, UpM  and the seasonal dummies. As 
can be seen, the coefficients of  RPy are all positive and indicate higher 
elasticities for females and blacks. 
Since the “cohort overcrowding” effect operates like a trend variable 
for half of the sample period, namely between 1958 and 1972, it is useful 
to see if  RPy is simply picking up a trend effect. Prior to 1958, RPy is 
either stable or declining and after 1972 it remains largely unchanged. 
The question is whether youth unemployment, after controlling for UpM, 
is best approximated by a TREND  or a cohort overcrowding variable. Of 
the eighteen age-sex-race groups, the equation with RPy instead of  a 
Table 6.1  Unemployment Equations with Demographic Overcrowding Variable 
1954:1-1978:4 
Male  Female  -  -  - 
Agelrace  RPy  UpM  R21D  W  RPY  UpM  R’IDW 
16-17 
Total  1.0424  .3347  .79611.832  1.1466  ,2382  .748/1.908 
White  .8592  ,3528  .76011.808  1.0103  ,2667  .70712.078 
Black  2.2524  ,2879  ,72811.478  2.0174  .1515  .65811.490 
18-19 
Total  ,4446  ,5516  34311.337  1.2097  ,2881  .743/1.188 
White  .2386  ,5862  .836/1.404  1.1605  .3137  .675/1.200 
Black  1.4952  ,4938  .63811.140  1.2334  ,2403  .61711.589 
20-24 
Total  ,5090  3548  .910/  ,702  1.1347  .5098  .891/1.360 
White  ,4733  A629  ,8931 ,728  1.2004  ,5158  ,87411.388 
Black  .7793  ,8352  ,7601 379  ,9269  ,4782  .65211.101 
(14.82)  (12.37)  (11.77)  (6.36) 
(11.22)  (11.98)  (9.34)  (6.41) 
(16.19)  (5.38)  (13.37)  (2.61) 
(6.40)  (20.86)  (14.24)  (8.82) 
(3.13)  (19.97)  (11.31)  (7.95) 
(10.99)  (9.43)  (11.90)  (6.02) 
(6.68)  (29.16)  (19.67)  (22.97) 
(5.51)  (26.12)  (18.43)  (20.59) 
(6.06)  (16.87)  (8.77)  (11.76) 164  Michael Wachter and Choongsoo Kim 
TREND yields a higher  R2 in  fifteen equations. This provides mild 
support for the RPy variable. Given their collinearity, it is not possible to 
distinguish between RPy and TREND  to the desired extent. Beginning in 
the late 1970s, however, these two variables diverge sharply. The RPy 
variable tends to be strongest in female and white male equations and 
weakest in  black male equations. This pattern  will  appear with con- 
sistency regardless of  the exact specification and/or the sample period of 
the equation. 
These results suggest that secular or intermediate swings in female and 
white youth unemployment rates do track well with RPy. The implication 
is that the unemployment rates of  youth groups have largely peaked 
relative to prime-age male unemployment rates.  Needless to say, we 
would be more comfortable with this conclusion if  the data period were 
longer and included several complete intermediate swing cycles. The 
unemployment data by race, however, does not predate the 1950s, and 
the unemployment data by  age and sex is only available after the late 
1940s. 
The black male  1624 age groups are the major exceptions to the 
notion that youth unemployment rates may have peaked. Since their 
unemployment rates continue to rise, the TREND variable has a larger t 
statistic than RPy in the black male equations. A major problem is to 
explain this divergence between black male youth unemployment rates 
and those of  other youth  group^.'^ 
6.3  Other Indicators of the Labor Market Status of Youths 
Youth unemployment is a more complex phenomenon than unemploy- 
ment for other age groups. Essentially, the unemployment rate construct 
is not attuned to the unique features of the youth labor market. Rather, it 
is based on the type of frictional and cyclical unemployment that is most 
relevant to prime-age males and, in general, to workers with a strong 
labor market attachment. 
Youth unemployment, on the other hand, is much more difficult to 
categorize. The key difference is that prime-age males tend to be in the 
labor force year round, full time (either employed or unemployed), and 
youths are frequently moving among jobs or into and out of  the labor 
force. Of  the 4.24 million males aged 18-19,  for example, only 2.37 
million were in the labor force and not in school in 1978. O'f  the 4.23 
million males aged 16-17,  only 1.12 million were in the labor force and 
not in school. Furthermore, since these numbers are annual averages 
(and thus include the summer months when many youths are not in 
school), they overstate the number that is in the labor market and not in 
school for the remainder of  the year. 165  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
Essentially, there are many options open to youths, besides being in 
the labor market, that fit into traditional roles. Young people, for exam- 
ple, can be in school, in the military, or at home beginning to raise their 
own families. In addition, they can combine these different activities; for 
example, a disproportionate number  of  youths who  are in the labor 
market are part-time workers. An increasing percentage of these young 
people combine being full-time students and part-time workers. More- 
over, the choice of  activities shifts frequently over the years. Relatively 
few young people aged 16 to 19 work year round, full time. One tradition- 
al pattern for this group is to work full time only during the summer 
months. Yet even for those who are not in school, changes in status 
between being employed, unemployed, and out of  the labor force can 
occur several times over the year. 
Of  importance for an evaluation of  the unemployment issue is that, 
from society’s  perspective, working year round, full time is not necessar- 
ily the most desirable activity for a young person. Particularly for teen- 
agers, attending school may be preferable to working. For some male 
youths, serving one’s military obligation ranks above civilian employ- 
ment. For young females, staying home and raising a family may be 
viewed as preferable to working. 
Given this perspective,  determining the youth  unemployment rate 
presents four major problems. First, since many if  not most youths are 
not in the labor force at any given time, the unemployment rate is a very 
incomplete measure of  that group’s economic position and well-being. 
Second, since youths move frequently among employment, unemploy- 
ment, and various nonlabor market activities, and are disproportionately 
part-time  workers  when  they  work,  their  unemployment  incidence 
should be higher than for other workers who have stronger attachments 
to their jobs. Third, since having a job is not necessarily the preferred 
activity and for some youth age groups is likely to be less desirable than 
schooling, changes in  the unemployment  rate  may  provide incorrect 
information  as to the nature and extent of  changes in the economic 
conditions in youth labor markets. Fourth, since many youths do not 
have a firm labor market attachment, the question of  whether they are 
“actively” seeking work (and thus are unemployed by the BLS definition) 
is often a matter of opinion and this leads to a considerable measurement 
error.  l4 
Our initial approach is to develop  alternative unemployment  rate 
indicators and to analyze how they vary over time. These new indicators 
for 1978 are shown in table 6.2.  The point is not that one is better than the 
other, but rather that each provides a different and useful perspective on 
the problem. Our U,  measure simply adds the military to the denomina- 
tor of the unemployment rate. Including the military in the denominator 166  Michael Wachter and Choongsoo Kim 
Table 6.2  Alternative Measures of Unemployment, 1978 
U3  or 
unemploy- 
ment of 
U, or  nonenrollees 
U,  or  unemploy-  divided by 
U  or  unemployment  ment divided  labor 
BLS  divided by  by labor force  force  + 
unemploy-  labor force  + school +  school + 
ment ratea  + militaryb  military"  militaryd 
Male 
White 
1617  17.1  16.9  10.1  4.8 
18-19  10.9  10.0  8.0  6.1 
20-24  7.6  7.1  6.4  5.8 
Black 
16-17  40.7  39.9  15.4  7.8 
18-19  30.9  26.3  18.5  14.2 
20-24  20.1  17.3  15.2  13.6 
Female 
White 
1617  17.1  17.1  9.8  4.8 
18-19  12.3  12.3  9.5  7.6 
2C-24  8.3  8.2  7.5  6.9 
Black 
16-17  41.9  41.9  14.8  8.7 
18-19  36.8  36.4  23.8  18.4 
20-24  21.6  21.3  18.6  16.8 
"Measured as UlL where Uis the number of  unemployed and L is the civilian labor force. 
bMeasured as Ul(L  +  M)  where M  is the number in the military. 
'Measured as U/(L  +  M  +  S- (SnL))  where S is the number in school and (SnL)  indicates 
those who are both in school and in the civilian labor force. 
dMeasured as (U-  (UnS))  l(L  +  M +  S -  (SnL)). 
of  U,  is an obvious addition since that construction is used by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and is referred to as the total (as distinct from civilian) 
labor force. Our U,  measure is constructed by adding those in school and 
those in the military to the denominator of  the unemployment rate; that 
is, U, = U/(L  + M  + S  -  (SnL).lS  Including individuals in school (but 
not including these individuals in the labor force since they are already 
included in L)  is controversial, but useful. Schooling can be viewed not 
only as a type of employment, involving general human capital training, 
but also as the preferred activity for many of the youth groups. Including 
schooling and military in the denominator, to yield an augumented labor 
force (ALF), helps to control for shifts among these activities which 167  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
result in fluctuations in the unemployment rate that may be related to 
labor demand conditions. 
The U3 construct, also depicted in table 6.2, moves further toward 
treating schooling on a par with employment. Workers, specifically  those 
who want to moonlight and work at more than one job, can be both 
employed at the first job and unemployed while looking for the second 
job. According to the definition of  unemployment,  however,  such a 
worker is counted as employed but not counted as unemployed. The 
same issue arises when schooling is included. If individuals are in school, 
should they also be counted as unemployed if they are looking for a job as 
well? The  U2 measure does count them as unemployed.  It is useful, 
however, to establish a U3 measure which excludes this group from the 
unemployment  pool.  The  U3 variable  is  defined  as  (U -  (UnS))/ 
The justification for this is that individuals whose major activity is 
school are likely to be part-time workers with a relatively marginal 
attachment to a job. The fact that they are in school indicates that they 
will soon be looking for a different kind of  job. Moreover, reporting 
errors for this group are especially large. What constitutes active job 
search for full-time students who are looking for part-time jobs? 
Whether or not one agrees with this argument, U3  is still an interesting 
measure of  unemployment. Correctly interpreted, it is the nonenrolled 
unemployed youths as a percentage of the population that is in school, in 
the military, or in the labor force. The difference between U and U3 is 
even larger than that for U and U2.  First, the unemployment rates are 
again reduced  considerably, with the largest reductions  affecting the 
youngest age group. For example, for white youths aged 16-17, the U, 
rate is 4.8%. If  schooling is viewed as a job (an investment in human 
capital for future productivity), then this age group is nearly fully em- 
ployed. Furthermore, one can make a good argument that the U3  defini- 
tion is closer to the meaning of unemployment for adults than is the BLS 
unemployment definition. 
Essentially, white youths aged 16-17 are largely in school. The school 
enrollment rate for white males aged 16-17  as an annual average was 
63.7% in 1978. But as mentioned above, teenage labor force statistics 
need to be inspected for the nonsummer period as well along with the 
annual average. For example, during the first quarter of 1978, the school 
enrollment rate for white males aged 16-17 was 81.4%. The U3  rate in the 
first quarter of  1978 was 2.6% while the rate in the third quarter was 
9.0%. That is, most of the 16-17  year old white males are in school in the 
winter and many of  these are unemployed during the summer. The U3 
rate for white males aged 16-17  during the winter, however, is below the 
unemployment rate for white prime-age males. 
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Even for blacks aged 16-17,  unemployment is largely a summer-time 
phenomenon. For black males aged 16-17,  U, is only 7.8% compared 
with a BLS measured unemployment rate of  40.7%. Looking at the first 
quarter of  1978 instead of  the annual data, the U, rate falls to 4.0%. 
An important feature of table 6.2 is to show that black unemployment 
for the 18-24  age group remains a problem even after moving from a U.  to 
a U3  construct. Having narrowed the definition so that it only covers the 
nonenrolled unemployed as a percentage of the school and work forces, it 
is disturbing that the resulting U,  measure is still approximately 15% for 
nonwhites. Moreover, the black U,  rates for the 18-24  age groups are still 
more than double the white U3  rates for comparable groups. 
The basic equations containing RPy and UpM  as independent variables 
were  estimated for the various  unemployment  constructs.  Since the 
schooling data at the desired level of  disaggregation are only available 
from 1962, the sample period is shortened to 1962:4 through 1978:4. For 
comparison purposes, the Uequations of table 6.1  are reestimated for the 
shorter time period. 
The results support the notion that the alternative unemployment rate 
indicators, and especially U3,  may be a better cyclical indicator of youth 
unemployment than the BLS unemployment rate measure. For example, 
in all but one male equation, the coefficient of  UpM  is higher when U, 
rather than  U is the dependent variable. In the female equation, the 
coefficient of  Up, is also larger for U,  than U for all the younger groups 
(where the school population is a significant percentage of  the total). 
Only for the female groups aged 20-24  are the coefficients insignificantly 
different from one another.I6 
6.4  The Alternative Activity Equations: 
6.4.1  Background 
Analyzing the labor market and general economic status of youths by 
focusing on unemployment presents severe problems. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics divides the youth population into four categories on the 
basis of major activity. The categories are employment, unemployment, 
schooling, and residual (denoted R).  Of  these four divisions, the unem- 
ployment category is the smallest. Furthermore, the response error for 
unemployment is considerably larger than for employment and school- 
ing. Especially for youths who may be either in school and looking for a 
part-time job or out of school for the summer and interested in working, 
the BLS question that refers to “actively” seeking work is ambiguous. 
Indeed, for most youth groups and particularly for teenagers, the notion 
of  unemployment and hence labor force is sufficiently flawed and is a 
weak statistic for policy purposes. 
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To  avoid concentrating solely on unemployment, we suggest a strategy 
of studying employment, unemployment, schooling, and the residual 
categories together. This allows for the observation of  flows across cate- 
gories. For example, it is useful to know whether a change in U,,  causes 
a net increase in the schooling (S)  or residual (R) categorie~.'~ 
One problem with the alternative activity equation approach is that the 
residual category, R, includes both some of  society's most advantaged 
and disadvantaged youths.I8 At one extreme, it includes high school 
dropouts who have such low skill levels that they cannot find a job, youths 
from welfare families who would cost their families their eligibility if they 
accepted a job, and youths who are in poor health. On the other hand, it 
also includes a large number of young females who are beginning to raise 
their families, teenagers who are taking the summer off, and relatively 
skilled youths who are pursuing other activities for a short period of time 
between jobs and/or school. 
There is a tendency among some researchers to interpret an increase in 
EIP as a positive development, especially if  it does not parallel a decrease 
in SIP. The work ethic aside, there is little basis for this view. Although it 
would be an easier problem if  R only included problem nonworkers, our 
inspection of  the data suggests that this is not the case. 
In the equations, we disaggregate the age-sex-race youth population 
into four mutually exclusive categories. The categories are UP,  (E  + M)/ 
P, (S  -  (Sfl  L))/P and RIP. These dependent variables were regressed 
with the same set of  independent variables, as indicated in equation (6), 
with the exceptions that the percentage in the military were included in 
the male equations and a time trend was included in the female equa- 
tions. 
By construction, the sum of the four dependent variables should be 
equal to one. The problem in estimating these dependent variables by 
single equation techniques is that the linear restriction across equations 
may not be satisfied. In order to estimate the coefficients  of the explana- 
tory variables for these four choices, subject to the linear constraint 
across equations, we used the logarithm of  the pairwise odds as the 
dependent variables. To  illustiate, denote the four youth categories as Pi, 
0  <  Pi <  1  ,  i = 1 ,  2,3,4,  and ZPi = 1. The dependent variables are then 
In  (Pi/P1),  i = 2,3, 4. The riE&ions  determine the ratios of  the prob- 
abilities. The absolute values can then be estimated using the condition 
that the sum of probabilities is equal to unity. The implicit coefficients  of 
the  respective  independent  variables  can  be  obtained  by  numerical 
estimation. Based  on the  coefficients from  the  Pi/Pl equations, the 
probabilities were computed by  changing one specific right-hand side 
variable by 1%.  These computed probabilities were compared with the 
corresponding original estimates to derive the implicit elasticities at a 
given period. These numerically derived elasticities for the third quarter 
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Table 6.3  Implicit Coefficients Derived From Constrained Equations: 
Implicit Coefficients of RPv, 19783 
Male  Female 
R 
Age/  PP  P  P  PP  P  P 
-  E  -  R  S-(SflL)  U  --  -  -  --  s-(snL)  u  E 
Race  P1  P2P3  P4  P1  P2  P3  P4 
1617 
Total  -.5W 
White  -  .9068 
Black  1.0749 
Total  .3485 
White  ,1132 
Black  1.5348 
20-20 
Total  1.4642 
White  1.1024 
Black  5.4521 
la19 
A093  .2441 
1.0256  .4418 
-  .3633  -  1.5747 
.3224  -.4480 
,4435  -.3748 
-  .5643  -  1.0509 
.7323  -.3295 
,8918  -.2889 
-  .1343  -  .6818 
-.3843  3157 
-.7449  ,7697 
,7839  1.6187 
2.5670  1.7067 
2.5505  1.5159 
3.1120  3.5698 
2.6901  1.0297 
2.7870  ,7907 
2.1400  2.8986 
.0371 
,2165 
-  .6933 
.3337 
.4852 
-  ,0459 
-  ,2925 
,5532 
-2.3216 
-  .0525 
-  .0864 
-  ,3870 
-  .5336 
-  .4748 
-  1.6399 
-  .3222 
-  .4256 
.2857 
-  ,443 
-  .380 







Table 6.4  Implicit Coefficients of  Up,,,,  1978:3 
Male  Female  - 
R  R 
Age1  P  P  P  P  P  PP  P 
Race  P1  P2  P3  P4  P1  P2P3  P4 
1617 
Total  ,1051  .2411  -.lo01  .0254  .0160  .2273  -.o958  .050 
White  .lo93  .3160  -  ,0858  -  .0097  ,0271  ,2710  -  .0872  .037 
Black  .0897  -.lo31  -.1872  .1631  -.0369  ,0528  -.1830  .120 
18-19 
White  -.o074  .6405  -.0826  ,1137  -.0790  .3993  -.0728  .089 
Black  ,1227  .2558  -.2043  ,3296  .0835  ,1556  -.1684  ,054 
20-24 
Total  .O600  .7820  -.0824  ,1745  -.0599  ,4918  -.0618  ,017 
White  .0415  .8370  -  ,0736  ,1718  -  .0905  S376  -  .0440  -  ,003 
Black  .2345  .5W -  .1527  .2104  .1207  ,3387  -  .1908  .139 
-  s-(sm)  u  E  --  -  -  E  -  s-(snL)  u  - 
Total  .0155  .5534  -.o963  .1544  -.0505  .3350  -.0819  ,080 
6.4.2  The Impact of  RPy 
For the constrained  UIP equations, six  of  the male and five of  the 
female equations had the anticipated sign of RPy.  It is interesting that the 
incorrect signs appeared in the black equations in all but one case. Does 
this suggest that the labor market position for black youths has improved 
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Table 6.5  Implicit Coefficients of  WIMW, 1978:3 
Male  Female  - 













-  .4774 
-  .4453 
-  .7215 
-  .4771 
-  ,4762 
-  .4218 
-  ,5435 
-  .4791 
-  1.0187 
-.2136  .2570 
-.4525  .2851 
,6640  .2238 
-.6632  .1911 
-.7328  .1491 
-.3860  ,4460 
-1.2411  .1825 
-1.2867  .1576 
-  ,9860  ,3465 
-  .0707 
-  ,1431 
.1209 
-  ,2976 
-  .1151 
-  ,7857 
-  .6549 
-  .6283 
-  ,6807 
-  .5827 
-  ,4966 
-  1.0165 
-  .6243 
-  .5837 
-  ,8797 
-  .0539 
.0216 
-  ,5657 
Table 6.6  Implicit Coefficients of AFIPOP, 19783 
-.4211  .2082 
-.4343  .1844 
-.4865  ,9728 
-  .2121 -  .1622 
-.1601  .1303 
-.2416  ,4702 
-.1235  .0831 
-.0401  .1137 




-  .03 
-  .05 
.010 
-  .157 




P  P  P  P 
P1  P2  P3  P4 
-  E  -  U  -  s -  (snL) 
16-17 
Total  .1535  -  ,1499  ,0165  -  ,0944 
White  ,1979  -  .1134  .0129  -  .1351 
Black  -  .0022  -  ,3133  ,1300  ,0347 
18-19 
Total  .2845  -  .1509  -  ,0441  .1914 
White  .3158  -  .lo82  -  .0534  ,2297 
Black  .1484  -  ,2810  .o060  ,1768 
20-24 
White  .2666  -  .3181  ,0035  ,0767 
Total  ,2354  -  .3668  ,0185  -  .0174 
Black  .0940  -  .4651  ,1108  -  ,2696 
To analyze this puzzling result, it is necessary to evaluate the other 
three activity equations. The equations indicate that the negative coef- 
ficients of  RPy in the U-P equations do not indicate an improvement in 
blacks’ labor market position.  Of  particular  importance are the EIP 
equations. For all but three of  the eighteen equations, EIP is negatively 
related to RPy. The only equation for blacks in which the coefficient is 
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RPy in the EIP equations are considerably larger for blacks than for 
whites. 
The public policy debate on youth unemployment invariably is in terms 
of  the BLS unemployment rate variable, UIL. It is therefore useful to 
convert the U-P and EIP equations of tables 6.3-6.6 so that their implica- 
tions for the more traditional unemployment rate variable can be ana- 
lyzed. The results are shown in table 6.7. Column l  of table 6.7 shows that 
the elasticity of  UIL with respect to RPy has the anticipated positive sign 
in all but two equations (black females aged 16/17 and 20-24). 
The results of  tables 6.3-6.7 make it clear that both black and white 
youth  labor market positions are adversely affected by  demographic 
overcrowding. However, the response pattern of  the two groups differs. 
For white youths, unemployment increases are large and are not offset by 
changes in labor force participation rates. For black youths, the unem- 
ployment response to RPy appears to be low, but this is mainly because of 
a sharp decline in participation rates. 
Given the linear restriction across equations, an increase in one of the 
Pi's requires a reduction in another. What happens to those workers who 
are not employed as a result of cohort overcrowding? The implicit coef- 
ficients of  RPy in the  (S -  (Srl  L))/P  and RIP equations provide an 
answer. 
Essentially, an increase in RPy,  ceteris paribus, leads to an increase in 
UIP,  a decrease in EIP, an increase in (S -  (S n  L))I  P and an increase in 
RI) P. The displaced employed workers largely migrate to full-time school 
Table 6.7  Percent Change in Unemployment Ratesa Due to One Percent 
Change in Respective Explanatory Variable in 1978:3, Derived from 
Constrained Equations 
Unemployment rates 
Male  Female 
Age1  - 
Race  RPy  UpM  AFIPOP  WIMW  RPY  UpM  WIMW 
1617 
Total  ,4694  ,2844  -.1387  -.3916  .0695  ,2567  -.5133 
White  .4956  ,3430  -.lo78  -.6284  .2511  .2879  -.5268 
Black  ,8095  .0556  -.2928  ,2896  -.1867  ,1407  -.8876 
18-19 
Total  ,6835  ,5744  -.0944  -.7545  ,7408  .3638  -.3109 
White  .7403  ,6523  -.0495  -.7951  ,8408  ,4122  -.2473 
Black  ,3703  .3472  -.2166  -.6260  1.0294  .2070  -.4498 
20-24 
Total  .9804  ,7962  -.3548  -1.3103  ,0281  ,4964  -.1873 
White  1.1025  ,8486  -.2998  -1.3451  .9174  .SO5  -.1262 
Black  .4660  ,6293  -.4872  -1.1259  -2.0224  ,4125  -  .1907 
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andlor to household activities. This is not, however, the complete story of 
the demographic overcrowding because of  the ceteris paribus assump- 
tion. For example, government policy, responding to the effects of  de- 
mographic overcrowding, may also affect the distribution of  the youth 
population across the four activity categories. When the AFIPOP and 
WIMW are removed  from  the schooling equation,  the sign on RPy 
becomes negative for white males. In addition, the TREND term poses 
obvious problems in the female equations. Since the intermediate-run 
demographic swings are highly correlated with a trend variable over the 
short estimation period, it is likely that TREND will capture some of 
these affects. That is, RPy does not reflect the full effect of demographic 
overcrowding because changes in other variables should also be antici- 
pated. 
6.4.3  The Impact of  UpM 
The cyclical variable, UPM,  produced the anticipated results. As illus- 
trated in table 6.3-6.6,  increases in UpM  are associated with little change 
in schooling; an increase in UIP with a decrease in EIP and an increase in 
RIP. 
The elasticities of  UIP with respect to Up, are the largest for white 
males. In addition, the elasticities tend to be larger for whites than for 
blacks,  for males than  for females, and for  older  than for  younger 
workers. For all age-sex-race categories the elasticities are less than 
unity. 
The overall results suggest a ranking of  youth groups in terms of  the 
cyclical versus structural sensitivity of  their unemployment rates (VIP). 
In general, youths are more structurally than cyclically sensitive in com- 
parison with adults. Females and the youngest youth groups are the most 
sensitive group to  structural rather then cyclical swings in unemployment. 
The ranking is also reflected in industry employment. For example, the 
older male  groups  have  a high concentration  of  employment in the 
high-wage, cyclically sensitive industries such as mining, manufacturing, 
and construction. The younger  and female  groups are more heavily 
represented in the low wage, acyclical industries such as retail and ser- 
vice. Industry employment patterns, however, cannot be viewed simply 
as a causal factor in the unemployment behavior of these groups. Rather, 
the underlying structural features of these groups’ labor market behavior 
is likely to determine their industry employment. For example, the 16-17 
age group, looking for part-time, after-school work, is most suited for 
employment in the retail and service sectors. Training costs and work 
scheduling in industries such as manufacturing are not suitable for this 
group’s casual labor market attachment. 
The ranking of black and white groups, in terms of the cyclical versus 
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blacks have a lower elasticity of  UIP with respect to UpM,  it is necessary to 
inspect the EIP as well as the UIP equation. Of particular interest is that 
black youths have a considerably higher EIP sensitivity to the business 
cycle than whites. That is, black youths have a lower UIP but a higher EIP 
elasticity with respect to UpM Since blacks and whites tend to be equally 
employed, in percentage terms, in the high- and low-wage industries, the 
cyclical nature of different industries cannot be a factor. 
One possible explanation is that the black youth labor market response 
is more closely related to fluctuations in layoffs and hirings. On the other 
hand, changes in the labor market status for white youths, as reflected in 
reentrant and new entrant rates, may be relatively more important. In 
any case, the ranking across races is more complex than across age and 
sex groups. 
6.4.4  The Impact of  WIMW 
The relative wage term exhibits the consistent and anticipated signs in 
the constrained equations.m  For all but one demographic group changes 
in schooling, unemployment, and the residual category are inversely 
related, while changes in employment are directly related to movements 
in WIMW. In other words, an increase in the youth market wage, ceteris 
paribus, is related to a shift into employment and out of  all other activi- 
ties. 
Of particular interest is the relationship between unemployment (VIP) 
and WIMW.  As previously suggested, the youth  unemployment rate 
depends upon the cost of being unemployed. Interpreting MW as a proxy 
for the reservation wage, an increase in the market wage, W,  leads to an 
increase in the cost of unemployment and hence a decrease in the unem- 
ployment rate. To the extent that WIMW represents a minimum wage 
variable, however, the decrease in UP,  following an increase in WIMW, 
would be interpreted as a demand-side effect. These two views cannot be 
isolated on the basis of the time series data. 
The one category that shows a mixed pattern with respect to WIMW is 
the residual  category, R. For the female equations, the three black 
groups and one white group are positively related, while the two white 
groups are negatively related to WIMW. Given the composition of  R, a 
priori predictions of  the signs of  the coefficients are not obvious. One 
factor,  however,  is that the female  R  category contains many more 
homeworkers who are raising families than the male R category. The 
resulting sign pattern is thus compatible with a demographic overcrowd- 
ing interpretation. In particular, a deterioration in WIMW may reduce 
completed family size and lead to an exit from R on the part of females. 
Since this household behavior response is not likely to be a factor in the 
male equations, the cost of unemployment argument should be dominant 
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6.4.5  The Impact of  AFIPOP 
The armed forces variable plays an important role in distinguishing 
between the unemployment rate patterns for whites and blacks. First, this 
variable  has had  a large variance  over the estimation period,  rising 
sharply during the Vietnam War and then declining close to its prewar 
levels during the mid to late 1970s. Second, the black and white male 
groups respond differently to A FIPOP. Unfortunately, given the data 
period, changes in AFIPOP, especially its sharp increase to a peak value 
in the early 1970s, parallel changes in RPy. This may reduce the confi- 
dence that can  be placed  in  interpreting separately  these  two  quite 
different independent variables. 
In the unemployment equations, the implicit coefficient of  A FIPOP 
was negative in each of  the nine male equations. The white and black 
equations, however, indicate a much greater sensitivity of  black unem- 
ployment to military employment. This could conceivably explain the 
fact that black youth unemployment has increased since 1970 relative to 
that of  white youths. Since both the percentage of  the military that is 
black and the percentage of blacks in the military have increased since the 
change to the all-volunteer forces, the decline in AFIPOP cannot be a 
major factor in the black male unemployment trends. 
The major differences in employment response also reflect the greater 
sensitivity of  black labor market conditions to the level of  military em- 
ployment. For employment, the coefficient differences between whites 
and blacks are particularly large. Indeed, white employment in the 18-19 
age group actually declines with increases in military employment. This is 
particularly surprising since EIP includes M as being employed. In other 
words, an increase in the military is associated with a decline in civilian 
employment for whites aged 18-19  that is larger than the number of 
whites who enter the military. 
The differential white-black response pattern also holds for schooling. 
The increase in AFIPOP is associated with a much larger increase in 
white than in black schooling. This probably reflects behavior during the 
draft period when increases in AFIPOP encouraged youths to remain in 
or return to school to secure student deferments. 
6.5  Considerations of the Deterioration of 
the Black Youth Labor Market 
6.5.1  Unemployment and Labor Force Developments 
Two basic factors suggest a deterioration in the labor market position 
for black relative to white youths during the 1970s. The first is that black 
youth unemployment increased throughout the 1970s. The second is that 
black youth EIP ratios fell over most of the past decade while white EIP 
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Since increases in unemployment may be less of a problem if  attribut- 
able to increases in participation rates, it is important to consider labor 
force and unemployment developments together. For black males, the 
participation rates decreased substantially for all age groups, while the 
rates for whites increased for all age groups. For females the situation is 
somewhat different. Both whites and blacks showed increasing participa- 
tion rates during the period. However, the percentage growth in partic- 
ipation rates was much smaller for blacks than for whites for all female 
cohorts. In sum, these changes in unemployment and participation rates 
suggest a deterioration in labor market conditions for blacks, especially 
for black males (see table 6.8). 
We have generally attributed the youth unemployment developments 
of  the past decade to supply side factors. In the case of  black males, 
however, the data on  UIL and EIP may indicate a possibly different 
picture. Presumably, increases in  UIL combined with decreases in LIP 
give at least the impression of  a deterioration in demand conditions. To 
what extent has the demand for black males shifted adversely relative to 
whites and black females? 
6.5.2  Trends in Secular Wages 
Whereas the employment situation has worsened for blacks relative to 
whites, the relative wages for blacks have increased continuously during 
the last decade. The overall white median usual weekly earnings for 
full-time, wage, and salary workers increased by 6.7% per year between 
1967 and 1977. However, the corresponding wage growth for blacks was 
8.0% on average during the same period. The black-white wage ratios 
increased from 0.692 to 0.776 for males and from 0.797 to 0.936 for 
females during this period. 
The full-time usual weekly earnings for youths whose major activities 
are other than school also show a similar pattern. Here again, the gap 
between black and white wage differentials has narrowed over time. 
Except for females aged 16-17,  the wages of  all black groups rose more 
than those of the comparable white groups. The black-white wage ratios 
increased from 0.832, 0.735, and 0.740 to 0.793, 0.799, and 0.868 for 
males aged 1617, 18-19,  and 20-24  groups respectively between 1967 
and 1978. For females, the corresponding ratios changed from 1.125, 
0.829, and 0.830 respectively to 0.914, 1.034, and 0.928. The puzzling 
development is that the groups with the most unfavorable unemploy- 
ment-employment indicators enjoyed the best earnings growth. 
6.5.3  Trends in Industry Employment 
To explore further the issue of deteriorating UIL  and EIPrates coupled 
with increasing relative wages for black youths, it is useful to explore the 
industry employment of black and white youths. For ease of analysis, we 177  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
Table 6.8  Unemployment Rates and Employment/Population  Ratios 
by Age-Race-Sex 
Unemployment ratesa  Employment ratiosb 
1965  1972  1978  1965  1972  1978 


























































































“The unemployment rates are defined as UIL. 
The  employment ratios are defined as EIP where both E and P  include the military. 
use the percentage of  each youth group which is employed in the retail 
and service sector compared with total employment of each demographic 
group. The retail and service sectors are the major employers of youths 
and are the lowest wage sectors. The data, presented in table 6.9, illus- 
trate two overall developments. First, the percentage of  black employ- 
ment found in the lowest wage sectors is approximately equal to the 
percentage of white employment in these sectors. There are slightly more 
black males but many fewer black females (as a percentage), in compari- 
son with white groups, in the low-wage sectors. Second, changes in the 
percentage of  low-wage employment has worsened for black relative to 
white males, but improved for black relative to white females. 
What is clear about these statistics is that they are not of great help in 
clarifying  the puzzle. As a compositional issue, the improvement in black 
relative wages cannot be explained by  the fact that their occupational 
status was unchanged. However, there is also no evidence of a significant 
deterioration in the employment status of black males that could explain 
their declining employment-population ratios and rising unemployment 
rates. 
For those who believe that each age-sex-race group has its own RPyi 
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Table 6.9  Proportion of Each Group’s Employment That Is in 
Low-wage Industries  (Service and Retall) 
Male  Female  - 
1968  1972  1978  1968  1972  1978 
White 
16-17  .7270  .7392  .7290  3239  .8422  ,8706 
18-19  ,4763  S298  S105  S440  ,6554  .6810 
20-24  ,3232  .3787  .3804  S287  S975  ,6148 
of  school)  .3650  ,4657  .4446  .4914  .6129  ,6399 
school)  .7765  .7833  ,7929  .8881  3967  .W51 
16 +  ,3037  .3317  ,3449  5755  .6124  ,6200 
Black 
16-21  (out 
16-21  (in 
16-17  .6617  .7013  .7435  3291  ,7655  ,8315 
18-19  ,4583  .4393  ,5429  S738  .6126  ,6514 
20-24  .3012  .3500  .3816  254.53  S267  ,5536 
of school)  .3519  ,4220  .4583  S277  319  .6150 
1621  (in 
school)  .7603  ,7831  3167  .8537  .8511  .8513 
16 +  .3256  .3307  .3457  .6429  .6350  .6121 
16-21 (out 
in explaining the declining black male employment ratios. Specifically, 
the ratio of black youth employment to white youth employment (where 
employment includes the military) has been virtually unchanged since 
1965. According to the “RPy,” model, the entire deterioration in EIP 
ratios for black males can thus be associated with their increasing per- 
centage in the youth population. Since we believe that overcrowding is 
better defined over youths as a single group, we do not find this result a 
compelling explanation. Moreover, the puzzle of declining EIP ratios for 
black males combined with increasing relative wage rates cannot be 
attributed to the higher growth rate of the black youth population. 
6.5.4  Trends in School Enrollment 
One of the main distinctive features between white and black groups 
over the last decade is that the school enrollment rates for all black groups 
increased substantially more than those for whites. Except for females 
aged 20-24,  the enrollment rates for whites decreased for all age-sex 
groups between 1965 and 1978. During the same period, the enrollment 
rates for blacks consistently increased. Furthermore, although the enroll- 
ment rates for all black age-sex groups were lower than those for the 
corresponding white groups in 1965, the situation was reversed by 1978. 
That is, by 1978 the enrollment rates for all black age-sex groups were 
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Does the increase in school enrollment rates for black males equal the 
decline in their EIP rates? The answer can be seen by comparing tables 
6.8 and 6.10. The increase in school enrollment captures almost all of the 
decline in EIP for black males aged 16-17.  For black males aged 18-19,  it 
picks up 4 of  the 10 percentage point decline. For the black male group 
aged 20-24,  a 17  percentage point decline in EIP is reduced to 10 percent- 
age points when SIPis  added. Perhaps as important, is that the wide gap 
between EIP rates for whites and blacks becomes a very narrow gap for 
most age-sex groups when (E  + (S n  E))  / P  is used as an indicator of labor 
market position. 
The nature of the problem depends upon how one evaluates schooling 
versus employment for youth. In level terms as of  1978, white youths 
enjoyed an advantage in the combined employment plus schooling ratio 
over comparable black youths. The trend is less obvious. The increase in 
white employment ratios is, in part, due to their declining school enroll- 
ment and increasing part-time work while in school. The decrease in 
black employment ratios is, in part, due to their increasing school enroll- 
ments. In addition, black enrollment has gained without a significant 
increase in after-school work (comparable to that found for white en- 
rollees). 
6.6  Summary 
In this paper we have advanced the argument that the deterioration in 
the absolute and relative youth unemployment ratios is due primarily to a 
cohort overcrowding effect. Other variables that seem to play a role are 
the decline in the size of  military service since the Vietnam War, the 
decline in the market wage for youths relative to some combination of 
minimum wages and government transfer programs, and a cyclical vari- 
able representing changes in demand. Since we control for the business 
cycle, which does not have a secular trend, the deterioration in the labor 
market position for youths over the past two decades can be attributed to 
labor supply factors. That is, the increasing unemployment rate of  this 
group represents an increase in their equilibrium unemployment rate due 
to overcrowding and the effects of  government labor market and social 
welfare programs. 
The BLS measured unemployment rate is usually the main piece of 
evidence  indicating  the  declining  labor  market  position  of  youths. 
Although we agree that an important decline has taken place, the magni- 
tude of  the job decline is overstated by the BLS statistics. Indeed, we 
argue that the BLS youth unemployment rate is a very weak statistic for 
policy purposes. Other measures of unemployment and/or employment 
ratios show less decline than do the BLS measures. For example, the 
percentage of youths who are either employed or in school is only slightly 
down from the 1965 levels. We argue that this variable, or an unemploy- 180  Michael Wachter and Choongsoo Kim 
Table 6.10  EmDlovment  + School" 
Population, 
1965 and 1978 

















88.0  87.6 
91.0  90.0 
94.0  91.1 
83.2  82.0 
83.0  77.0 
88.9  78.5 
80.0  83.1 
71.0  77.6 
52.7  71.2 
74.0  77.0 
56.9  61.4 
52.5  59.5 
"The specific measure is E +  M  +  S -  (SnE), 
P 
ment rate construct which  treats schooling as equivalent in status to 
employment, is more useful as an indicator of the labor market position 
of  youths with respect to jobs. 
Whereas the job decline is less serious than the BLS unemployment 
rate indicates, the decline in the relative wage of  youths may be more 
central to the relevant issues. That is, the labor market problem of youths 
is more a problem of low skill and hence low wage levels than of  a lack of 
jobs.  The  increasing  employment-population  ratios  for  most  youth 
groups, in spite of  the high increase in their population, is one source of 
evidence of the ability of the economy to create large numbers of youth 
jobs. 
Black males are the one sex-race youth group that combines steadily 
deteriorating unemployment and employment ratios. There are prob- 
lems, however, in determining to what extent the overall position of this 
group has declined. First, the relative wage for black youths, both males 
and females, has improved relative to white youths. Second, the decline 
in employment and increase in relative wages have not been matched by a 
significant change in  the proportion of  black males in  the low-wage 
industries. The percentage of  black male employment remains approx- 
imately the same as the percentage of  white male employment in the 
low-wage sectors. Finally, school enrollment rates have been increasing 
for blacks and decreasing for whites. As a result, the ratios of  those 
employed plus those in school, as a percentage of  the relevant popula- 181  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
tion, show less of  a difference between black and white youths than the 
employment ratios alone. But, from a social welfare perspective, it is 
difficult to weigh  the increase in joblessness against the increase in 
relative wages and school enrollment. 
The increase in the percentage of  black males who are both out of 
school and not employed implies that a component of  the black male 
youth population has suffered a significant decline in their relative eco- 
nomic status. This suggests that for black males aged 16-24  there may be 
a growing divergence in labor market performance. 
Notes 
1. See, for example, Wachter (1972; 1976b; 1977), and Kim (1979). This work builds 
upon Easterlin (1968). Several relevant studies and a detailed bibliography are contained in 
Espenshade and Serow (1978). More recent work which develops this approach includes 
Ehrenberg (1979), Welch (1979), and Reubens (1979). 
2. For a detailed dlscussion of  the endogenous taste model for explaining economic- 
demographic variables,  see Easterlin, Pollak and Wachter  (forthcoming). The relative 
income model is presented in Easterlin (1968) and Wachter (1972; 1976b). 
3.  See, for example, Cain and Watts (1973). 
4. The statistical problems of  measuring the youth labor force is stressed by Clark and 
5.  This model is drawn from Wachter and Wachter (1978). 
6. In equations (3) and (4) it is assumed that experience or  skill can be acquired only with 
age. The result is that the number of A workers only increases with the population and 
participation rates of A workers. In fact, the rate of accumulation of skill can be increased by 
more intensive training. The cost for training is likely to be upward sloping and steeper in 
the short than in the long run. Consequently, the accumulation of human capital will be 
slowed as workers spread their training to avoid the higher short-run costs. (This factor of 
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7. An alternative measure of labor market pressure,  denoted UGAP, yielded similar 
results.  The UpM  variable was used  instead of  UGAP because the latter contains the 
unemployment rate of  youths. For a discussion of  UGAP, see Wachter (1976a). 
8.  See, for example, Ragan (1977). 
9. In this chapter, the terms blacks and nonwhites are used interchangeably. 
10. An alternative variable, W/MW*C,  where Cis  the coverage rate, did not perform as 
well across equations.  Especially given the lack of success of  the coverage variable, our 
WiMW cannot be interpreted as a straight minimum wage effect. As indicated, it cannot be 
empirically differentiated,  in most equations,  from a supply-side variable that measures 
changes in government transfer programs. 
11. For a detailed discussion of the problems with measuring government policy vari- 
ables, see the original NBER discussion paper. 
12. The impact of  welfare programs has received relatively limited attention until re- 
cently. See Levitan et. al. (1972), Garfinkle and Orr (1974), Saks (1975), Williams (1975), 
Levy (1979) and the Studies in Public Welfare of the Joint Economic Committee (1973). 
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Goldfarb (1974), Gramlich (1976), Mincer (1976), Welch (1976), (1977), Ashenfelter and 
Smith (1979), and U.S. Department of Labor (1970). 
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For several relevant models on the impact of  direct job creation see Killingsworth and 
Killingsworth (1978) and Palmer (1979). 
13. Some of  the relevant papers that provide an empirical framework for the youth 
unemployment problem include Kalachek (1969), Doeringer and Piore (1971-), R.  A. 
Gordon (1973), R. J. Gordon (1977), and Adams and Mangum (1978). 
Recent empirical time series studies on youth unemployment which address this same 
phenomenon include Freeman and Medoff (1981), Ragan (1977), Thurow (1977), and the 
conference on Youth Unemployment (1978). 
14. Conceptual problems with the definition of  the unemployment rate for youths are 
stressed by  R. A. Gordon (1973), Levitan and Taggart (1974), and Clark and Summers 
(1979). 
15. The n notation indicates the intersection of  two variables. Hence SnL  indicates 
those who are in school and in the labor force. 
16. The results were included in the original NBER working paper prepared for the 
conference. 
17. Relevant studies on schooling include Freeman (1976) and the recent comment by 
Smith and Welch  (1978). Kim  (1979) investigates the complexities of  the military and 
schooling relationship with the youth labor market. A very useful collection of  essays is 
found in the NCMP volume (1976). 
18. One of  the major questions concerning the R category involves the issue of discour- 
aged workers. The view that the number of disadvantaged potential workers in the R group 
is significant  is stressed by Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Harrison (1972) among others. 
19. For those who prefer to anal ze estimated coefficients directly, the equations for 
the four activities,  unconstrained by  zp.  = 1  were presented in the original NBER working 
paper. 
20.  In the unconstrained equations, the pattern  of  the signs is  unchanged, but  the 
variable is only marginally significant. 
21.  Studies  which focus on minority unemployment include Doeringer and Piore (1971), 
Harrison (1972), Wallace (1974), the Congressional Budget Office (1976), Adams and 
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Comment  Edward Kalachek 
During the 1960s youth unemployment rates deteriorated relative to 
those of adults. The relative unemployment performance of white youths 
stabilized in the early 1970s but deterioration continues among blacks. 
Despite  the importance  of  this phenomenon, economists have been 
unable to develop statistically  convincing explanations. The labor market 
Edward Kalachek, formerly professor of economics at Washington University, died in 
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models that explain  rather  well why  young persons experience high 
unemployment have limited power in explaining why youth rates have 
risen so much relative to those of adults. Wachter and Kim approach this 
somewhat embarrassing problem with a supply-side  explanation based on 
two constructs, demographic or  cohort overcrowding and a socially deter- 
mined minimum wage. The first construct ,  cohort overcrowding, assumes 
that younger  and older workers are imperfect substitutes.  Given the 
embodiment of  human and physical capital, the short-run elasticity of 
substitution between  youths  and  adults  is  quite low.  Consequently, 
changes in relative  cohort sizes will  be  reflected in disproportionate 
changes in relative wages. To make matters worse, the material aspira- 
tions of  young married workers are formed while they are still living in 
their parents’ homes. Faced with lower than expected relative wages, 
young families opt for fewer children and for more market hours. 
The second construct, the socially determined minimum wage, empha- 
sizes the supply rather than the demand implications of  changes in the 
legally required minimum. Changes in the coverage or the level of  the 
minimum wage are not likely to occur as isolated political acts, but rather 
reflect a social mood that will manifest itself through the liberalization of 
transfer payments and of  other social welfare programs. More liberal 
welfare programs will shift the budget line and reduce the cost of nonem- 
ployment. Furthermore, the minimum wage establishes a wage below 
which it is not socially acceptable to work. Increases in the minimum 
wage will thus alter leisure-consumption goods trade-off. Workers will no 
longer be willing to provide market effort at wages which hitherto were 
acceptable. The effect of higher reservation wages on the supply side may 
be as or more important than the demand-side effect. 
The two constructs can now be combined to generate the time series 
scenario. The relative size of the youth cohort did increase substantially 
during the 1960s, and given that production processes adjusted slowly, 
relative youth earnings dropped. For many youths the market clearing 
wage was driven below the rising social minimum. Youth employment 
rose substantially but so did youth unemployment. Here Wachter and 
Kim develop an important and frequently overlooked point. In a compar- 
ative static analysis of workers with constant taste and perfect knowledge 
of  this taste, individuals with market wages below the social minimum 
would exist and remain out of  the labor force. In the real world, slight 
changes in tastes, mood, need, or health will lead to labor markets entry, 
to brief spells of  employment, and to frequent reported unemployment. 
This chapter would have benefited from a formally developed labor 
supply model. The argument that economic tastes and aspirations are 
molded during the period one lives with one’s parents implies a forward 
falling labor supply curve, at least for married workers and over some 
range. The social minimum wage concept implies that the labor supply 187  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
schedule has been shifting inward at low relative wage levels. Between 
the two it is not clear whether more or less labor will be effectively 
supplied at lower relative wages, and the authors seem to want to have it 
both ways. Otherwise, this is a neat piece of political economy; that is to 
say, an imaginative use of  economic reasoning to explain a bothersome 
real-world development. The authors are particularly to be commended 
for rescuing the social minimum wage from its subterranean existence in 
the informal conversations of labor economists and government officials 
and bringing it to the respectability of the published page. Stress on the 
social minimum wage is consistent with the finding reported elsewhere in 
this volume (chapter 2 and 7) that teenage unemployment is heavily 
concentrated among less than 10% of the population. It is also consistent 
with the experiences of  those who have attempted to obtain youngsters 
for house  or yard  work.  Indeed,  both  constructs are appealing, but 
difficult to demonstrate empirically. Hence it is not surprising that the 
empirical section provides at most rather modest support for the theory. 
The paucity of  appropriate data on transfer payments, job creation, 
and the minimum wage does inhibit empirical research. Still, it is not 
quite accurate to describe the time series minimum wage variable as 
largely a spike in 1967. Effective coverage and the relative size of  the 
minimum both increased substantially in teenage intensive activities after 
1967. Ragan'  and others have already ably demonstrated the adverse 
impact of  the minimum wage on teenage employment and unemploy- 
ment. An analysis of Ragan's work suggests that Wachter and Kim would 
have obtained similarly strong findings but for their relative population 
variable. It is thus unfortunate that the estimating procedure does not 
allow a fair or reasonable test of  demographic overcrowding. A current 
quarter correlation of  relative youth population with measures of youth 
labor market performance is a test for instantaneous rather than for slow 
adjustment of  production processes to cohort size. A test of  a demo- 
graphic overcrowding hypothesis requires a distributed lag on the relative 
youth population. As it is, results could be better interpreted if  signif- 
icance levels were shown. The strongest evidence for demographic over- 
crowding presented in this chapter is contained in table 6.8, which shows 
dramatic increases in teenage employment-population ratios between 
1965 and 1972  and between 1972 and 1978. Further support is provided by 
the fact that a similar cohort bulge in Europe is also associated with 
higher youth unemployment rates. 
In common with other scholars who have analyzed the youth labor 
market, Wachter and Kim express acute dissatisfaction with the appro- 
priateness of the BLS concept of unemployment for this age group. They 
propose three supplementary measures: U1  ,  U2  and U3.  Ul  is identical to 
the BLS measure except that military employment is included in the 
denominator, as well it should be. U2  adds those school attenders who are 188  Michael Wachter and  Choongsoo Kim 
currently neither counted as employed or as unemployed to the denomi- 
nator of  U,, since school attendance can be regarded as a work activity 
and is a socially acceptable alternative to paid employment for young- 
sters.  U3 eliminates the unemployment of  school attenders from the 
numerator of U,.  This is the logical next step once school attendance is 
accepted as the equivalent of work. Since employment dominates unem- 
ployment in the BLS classification system, workers with one job who are 
also hunting for another are classified as employed rather than as unem- 
ployed. The array of  new unemployment measures is shown in table 6.2 
for 1978, though unfortunately a time series for U,, U,,  and 17,  is not 
generated. For 1978  the array of measures provides a more balanced and 
certainly a more sanguine view than is obtained by simple reliance on the 
BLS measure. Indeed, if  U3  were to be accepted as the best measure, high 
youth unemployment would become a problem of blacks rather than a 
general problem. 
These new unemployment measures are a useful contribution. The 
BLS measure is institutionally and historically based rather than being 
well grounded in current theory. The distinction between market and 
nonmarket work is far more important to the Internal Revenue Service 
than it is to anyone else. School attendance past age 16 is presumably a 
voluntary activity and the empirical evidence indicates that it is a highly 
productive economic activity. If  we are willing to go this far, though, we 
must proceed still further and treat all legitimate nonmarket work as 
employment whether it is performed by  youths or adults.  The most 
general derivation of  the U3  measure would include in the denominator 
and subtract if  necessary from the numerator any person engaged in 
significant nonmarket work. Assuming for simplicity that it is the wife 
who normally specializes in housekeeping and child-raising  ,  alternative 
measures are required for female as well as for youth unemployment. 
The U3  measure for married women, spouse and children present, will of 
course always be zero. Although this seems to define the problem away, it 
may  point in the right direction. Most persons primarily engaged in 
important nonmarket work activity are not unemployed by reasonable or 
standard criteria. Rather, they wish to  work more hours per year than are 
available, and they wish to work these hours in rather than out of  the 
marketplace.  U3 would then be an insightful measure of  labor market 
performance, so long as it were supplemented by an appropriate measure 
of  the discrepancy between actual and desired hours. 
Note 
Economics and Statistics, May 1977:12!4-36. 
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Comment  Robert J. Gordon 
There is much to applaud in the chapter by Wachter and Kim. Three 
appealing methodological features of  the approach should be  noted 
before we study the basic hypotheses and results: 
1. Instead of  providing us simply with regressions explaining youth 
unemployment, the authors study jointly four mutually exclusive youth 
activities: employment, unemployment, schooling, and “other.” Since 
equations are presented as tetrads, when an exogenous variable causes an 
increase in youth unemployment we can look to the other three equations 
to find out whether the higher unemployment rate is balanced by  a 
decline in employment, in schooling, in “other,” or in all three. 
2. The authors argue that for most youths, schooling and military 
service are alternatives to work and that the unemployment rate should 
correspondingly be redefined as the number of  unemployed divided by 
the total number of  youths engaged in employment, unemployment, 
school, and military service (adjusted to eliminate the double counting of 
the employed and unemployed who are also in school). Two new unem- 
ployment ratio concepts are introduced, with the same expanded de- 
nominator  and  a numerator composed of  the conventional count  of 
unemployed  (U,)  and  alternatively  the  unemployed  not  enrolled in 
school (U3).  The new concepts make an enormous difference, and, for 
instance, reduce the 1978 white unemployment rate from the 1617  age 
group from the BLS figure of  17.1% to the U,  figure of 4.8%. For blacks 
in that age group, the reduction is from 40.7% to 7.8%. 
3.  A general methodological feature of  the chapter is a consistent and 
healthy skepticism as to whether the results are really what they seem. Is 
the relative share variable just picking up a time trend? Does the mini- 
mum wage variable just stand as a proxy for the influence of all govern- 
ment  transfer  programs?  Can one discriminate in a meaningful way 
between demand and supply factors that impede relative wage flexibility? 
The authors fully recognize that their coefficients  may be consistent with 
several interpretations,.and their attention to  potential ambiguity in their 
results should serve as a model for subsequent research. 
The Hypotheses 
The point of  departure for the paper is a pair of  hypotheses. First, 
youth and adult workers are imperfect substitutes for each other, largely 
because young workers have a shorter expected tenure over which em- 
ployers can expect to amortize the costs of specific  training. Although the 
underlying cause of short youth tenure is left unexplained, presumably a 
Robert J. Gordon is associated with Northwestern  University and the National Bureau of 
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contributing  factor  must  be  experimentation  with  different  career 
alternatives, as well as the freedom enjoyed by American youths (espe- 
cially relative to British and European youths) in shifting at low cost back 
and forth between work and school. 
A second component of  the Wachter-Kim model is an endogenous 
model of  the birth  rate and of  labor force participation.  The central 
ingredient is a sticky reservation or aspiration income level. Thus when a 
temporary oversupply of young workers drives down the real hourly wage 
rate, the desired income level can be maintained only by an increase in 
hours  of  work,  mainly through  an  increase  in  female  participation 
achieved through a reduction in family size. Thus a generation of  “baby 
boom” is automatically followed by  a subsequent era of  “baby bust.” It 
should be noted that if the income aspiration level is completely constant, 
then the labor supply curve becomes a rectangular hyperbola, with shifts 
in the real wage generating equiproportionate changes in hours worked in 
the opposite direction. 
The basic idea of  imperfect substitution must be supplemented by 
additional assumptions if  it is to predict a particular response of youth 
unemployment to an increase in the relative supply of youths following a 
baby boom. Since Wachter and Kim fail to provide any simple theoretical 
diagram to facilitate an exposition of their approach, I provide here figure 
C6.1, which aids in a consideration of some of  the important issues. In 
figure C6.1 the vertical axis measures  the log of  the wage  of  youth 
workers relative to adults, and the horizontal axis measures the log of the 
number of youth workers relative to adults. The assumption of imperfect 
substitutability is embodied in the downward sloping relative demand 
curve (d). The initial situation, before the increase in relative supply, is 
depicted by the two left-hand upward sloping supply curves, the relative 
supply of youth manhours to labor force activity (no),  and the supply of 
employed manhours (so).  The horizontal distance between the two sup- 
ply schedules represents the supply of “voluntary search man-hours,” the 
outcome of the worker’s rational balancing of the marginal benefits and 
costs of  search. In the initial situation at point A,  it is assumed that all 
unemployment is voluntary, and that the labor market is in equilibrium at 
the crossing point of  the demand (d)  and supply (so)  schedules. 
The two supply curves are drawn so that the percentage unemployment 
rate  (for instance the ratio AB at the initial relative wage wo)  depends 
inversely on the wage rate. A permanent wage reduction should cause a 
substitution away from market work toward the joint activity of “search- 
ing and waiting.”’ Now consider the effects of an increase in the relative 
supply of youth labor, shown as a shift to the new pair of supply curves, s1 
and nl, drawn to exhibit the same voluntary unemployment rate at the 
initial relative wage (DE  =  AB).  The outcome depends on the degree of 
flexibility of  the relative wage. If  the relative wage drops from wo  to wl, 191  Time Series Changes in Youth Joblessness 
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the demand for employed manhours rises from eo to el, and the decline in 
the relative wage rate also induces an increase in the rate of  voluntary 
unemployment (FG >AB).  The opposite possibility occurs if the relative 
wage is absolutely rigid, as would be caused by a minimum wage with 
universal coverage set by the legislature as a constant fraction of the adult 
wage rate. The relative demand for youth manhours would remain fixed 
at eo, and the relative unemployment rate would rise from AB  to AE,  of 
which BE would be involuntary. 
To determine whether the model of imperfect substitution is relevant, 
and whether the relative wage has been flexible in response to observed 
changes in relative supply, I have estimated two regression equations in 
which the observations are sixteen age-sex groups, and the variables are 
the logs of the ratios of  1974 to 1956 values of the group unemployment 
rates  (LRUJ,  the group relative wage rates  (LRW,), and the group 
labor-force shares (LRS,).  The results show a strong positive statistical 
association between relative labor force shares and relative unemploy- 
ment rates, and a strong negative statistical association between relative 
labor force shares and relative wage rates: 192  Michael Wachter and Choongsoo Kim 
LRUi=  .lo4 +  .463 LRSi  R2 = .412 
SEE = .194  [2.058]  [8.129] 
LRWi=  - .088 -  .355 LRS,  R2 = SO4 
[ -  2.7211  [ -  3.7681  SEE = .124 
Here the numbers in brackets are t-ratios. As an example, the labor force 
share of  male youth aged 20-24  increased by  51.0% between 1956 and 
1974. Equation (1) predicts an increase in the group unemployment rate 
by 23.6% as compared to the actual increase of  26.1%. Equation (2) 
predicts a decrease in the relative wage rate by 18.1% as compared to the 
actual decrease of  20.4% (from an actual ratio in 1956 of  71.2% of the 
wage paid to males 35-44 to 56.7% in 1974).* 
The observed sensitivity of  the relative wage to changes in relative 
supply is consistent both with the hypothesis of imperfect substitutability 
as well as with that of relative wage flexibility. Whether the relative wage 
was “perfectly” flexible or not cannot be determined from the results, 
since the observed increase in the relative unemployment rates of  those 
groups in greater relative supply could have resulted either from the 
response of voluntary unemployment to the lower relative real wage or to 
involuntary unemployment caused by the incomplete adjustment of  the 
relative wage. 
The Time Series Results for Whites 
While it contains no explicit estimates of  the response of  the relative 
youth wage to relative population shares, the Wachter-Kim chapter does 
present evidence that is broadly consistent with the simple cross-section 
regressions presented in equations (1) and (2). The higher population 
share of  white youths has been associated with more unemployment, 
schooling, and “other” activity at the expense of  less employment. By 
itself this conclusion does not tell us whether the increase in unemploy- 
ment was voluntary or not, i.e., whether the observed higher level of 
unemployment corresponds to the interval A E or FG  in figure C6.1. Our 
own evidence rules out A E because of the strong downward response of 
the relative wage evident in equation (2). And Wachter and Kim appear 
to rule out FG indirectly in their  finding that unemployment has re- 
sponded positively to the minimum wage, suggesting that minimum wage 
legislation may have interfered with the free downward movement in the 
relative youth wage required to clear the labor market. This minimum 
wage evidence is not as strong as would appear from the text of  the 
chapter, however,  because no measures of  statistical significance are 
presented. (In the first draft of the chapter only one-third of the relative 
wage coefficients were  both  significant at the 5%  level and had  the 
anticipated sign.) 
(1) 
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The time series results also indicate a very strong and significant effect 
on youth unemployment of  the prime-age male unemployment rate, a 
proxy for aggregate demand. Thus an aggregate demand expansion can 
achieve a reduction in youth unemployment, yet the elasticity is below 
unity, implying that the demand expansion raises the unemployment rate 
of  youths relative to prime-age men. This result confirms the earlier 
conclusion of Feldstein (1973) that high relative teenage unemployment 
rates cannot be reduced by expansive aggregate demand policy. Wachter 
and Kim also confirm Feldstein’s finding that the relevant elasticities are 
higher for adults than for young teenagers, and for whites than for blacks. 
An important new result is that the black sensitivity is actually greater 
than that of  whites but shows up in cyclical fluctuations of  the employ- 
ment-population ratio rather than in the conventional unemployment 
rate, confirming the conventional impression that blacks are victims of 
recessions because of their marginal job status, but that their job losses 
are translated  into  nonparticipation  and  “disguised unemployment” 
rather than fully into an increase in the official unemployment rate. 
The Aspiration Hypothesis of  Demographic Behavior 
Much is made in the chapter of  the hypothesis of  an “echo effect” 
theory of demographic behavior, in which an oversupply of young people 
due to a baby boom in the previous generation creates a decline in the 
current generation’s real wage relative to its aspiration  level and an 
offsetting  shift from child-raising  to market labor force participation. Yet 
there is no evidence in the paper that is even relevant to the hypothesis, 
let alone any evidence that confirms it. 
1. By and large an increase in the relative minimum wage in table 6.7 
shifts young people from employment to unemployment, schooling, and 
the “other” category. But, as the authors recognize, this provides no 
evidence as to whether the response represents a conventional substitu- 
tion  effect on the demand  side or a more indirect link between the 
minimum wage and the “aspiration wage” of  youths. 
2.  The Wachter-Kim hypothesis interprets the declining birth rates 
and rising female labor force participation rates of the 1960s and 1970s as 
transitory phenomena that will be reversed when the current generation 
of “baby bust” children enters the labor force and finds its relative wage 
rising sufficiently by 1990 to send females back to the hearth to set about 
busily having four children apiece. An alternative hypothesis is that the 
recent behavior of the birth rate and female participation reflect perma- 
nent changes involving a changed perception of  the social role of women. 
Not only do Wachter  and Kim fail to provide  any support for their 
interpretation that the recent behavior has been transitory rather than 
permanent, but they make no attempt to reconcile the rectangular hyper- 194  Michael Wachter and  Choongsoo Kim 
bolic shape of the labor supply curve required by their theory with the 
substantial body of  evidence available that suggests a positively sloped 
labor supply curve for secondary workers. 
3.  A convincing demonstration of  the cohort overcrowding theory of 
birthrate determination would require a much longer-term study. Even if 
Wachter and Kim had provided evidence on the birthrate issue, their 
sample period only contains one degree of freedom, the observed decline 
in birth rates between the 1950s and 1970s. Would their approach be able 
to explain the decline in birth rates between the 1920s and 1930s? My 
suspicion is that there was no problem of  cohort overcrowding among 
young people at the end of the 1920s but rather the reverse because of the 
restrictive immigration legislation of  1924. 
The Black Youth Unemployment Puzzle 
Wachter and Kim leave unresolved their anomalous results for black 
youths that pose the paradox of improving school attainment and wage 
rates relative to whites, set against a deterioration in relative unemploy- 
ment rates and especially in employment/population ratios. Part of  the 
decline in the E/P  ratio is, to be sure, a direct consequence of  increased 
school attendance, but there is still a substantial problem evident in their 
table 6.10, which displays population shares engaged in schooling plus 
employment plus military service (minus the overlap involving working 
school enrollees). The deterioration in the black position is evident if we 
take the 1965-78  change in the white ratio and subtract the same change 
for blacks, as in table C6.1. Not only has the relative position of  blacks 
deteriorated substantially between 1965 and 1978, but the absolute level 
of the ratio for the two older groups, both male and female, is between 12 
and 16 percentage points lower for blacks than for whites in 1978. 
The imperfect substitution framework used earlier in figure C6.1 is 
useful in sorting out hypotheses regarding the source of the black prob- 
lem. In figure C6.2 the vertical axis is the log of  the black wage rate 
relative to whites, and the horizontal axis is the log of black employment 
relative to whites. In contrast to figure C6.1, where the major event is a 
shift in the supply of  young people relative to adults, I assume in figure 
C6.2 that the observed shift in the relative supply of  black youths was 
relatively minor compared to a shift in relative demand. Starting from an 
initial situation at point A, with  a  relative wage of  wo and  relative 
employment of eo, the new situation must be one with the higher relative 
black wage documented by Wachter and Kim. If  there had been a simple 
shift in relative demand because of antidiscrimination legislation and the 
improved relative productivity of  blacks resulting from their higher rela- 
tive school attainment, the new situation would have occurred at point C, 
with a higher relative wage (wl) and a higher employment/population 
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Table C6.1  1-78  Change in Ratio of Employment + School to Population 
White  Black  Difference 
16-17  -  0.4  -  1.2  0.8 
18-19  -  1.0  -6.0  5.0 
20-24  -2.9  -  10.4  7.5 
Female 
16-17  3.1  3.0  0.1 
18-19  6.6  4.5  2.1 
20-24  18.5  7.0  11.5 
SOURCE:  Wachter and Kim, table 6.10. 
ment situation, even after the adjustment for schooling, suggests that 
instead the labor market has moved to a point like F,  with an unemploy- 
ment rate of  FG  divided between conventionally measured and “dis- 
guised” unemployment. 
The shift  to point  F  rather than  to point  C is  easily explained if 
antidiscrimination and minimum wage legislation have raised the actual 
relative wage paid to blacks faster than their relative productivity has 
increased. This is  entirely  consistent with  the evidence provided  by 
Wachter and Kim that “the groups with the most unfavorable unemploy- 
ment-employment indicators enjoyed the best earnings growth,” on the 
assumption that in the initial situation wage rates better reflected produc- 
tivity differentials than in the new situation. The Wachter-Kim chapter 
contains no evidence on the relative roles of  the minimum wage and 
antidiscrimination legislation in bringing about this compression of wage 
differentials,  but since there was no important trend in  the effective 
minimum wage over this period  (only a sawtooth pattern), it would 
appear that antidiscrimination legislation may have been an important 
source both of  the improved relative black wage and the deteriorating 
relative black unemployment-employment ~ituation.~ 
Figure C6.2 is not the only possible interpretation of the black unem- 
ployment problem, because the implicit assumption that there has been 
an upward shift in the relative demand curve may not be valid. A new 
situation with  a higher relative wage  and lower relative employment 
could have been reached along the original relative demand curve (do),  as 
well as along a lower demand curve, as long as there was an effective floor 
on the relative wage that forced blacks off of their relative supply curve. 
While increased education and urbanization  may  have improved the 
relative ability of  blacks to compete for jobs, the ongoing shift of  blue- 
collar jobs out of the central cities to the suburbs may have caused the net 
relative demand for young blacks, particularly males, to deteriorate. As 
one example, between 1970 and 1976 the number of  jobs on Chicago’s 1%  Michael Wachter and Choongsoo Kim 
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black West Side dropped by 27.7% and by more than 10% on the South 
Side. In contrast, jobs in suburban northwestern Cook County increased 
by more than 30%, and by more than 60% in all-white suburban DuPage 
County. “In the 1960 and 1970 decades, most of the new jobs created in 
suburban Chicago were blue-collar jobs, whereas most new suburban 
homes were for upper-middle-class professional workers. As a result, 
there are now a lot more factory jobs in the suburbs than factory work- 
ers” (McManus, 1979). 
At least partly as a result of this phenomenon, Chicago has the widest 
disparity of any major U. S. city between black and white unemployment 
rates  (14.7%  vs.  5.1%  in  1976). To  the extent that  the problem  is 
pervasive, if  less extreme, in other cities, it would appear that the con- 
tinuation of  housing discrimination and segregation has aggravated the 
black employment problem and may have largely offset the favorable 
demand effects of  antidiscrimination legislation in  employment. The 
tendency of  Chicago and other cities to generate new blue-collar jobs in 
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district may  also help  to explain why  the employment situation  has 
deteriorated more for black males than for females (although table C6.1 
indicates  a  substantial  relative  deterioration  for black  females aged 
20-24). 
There are other important causes of the growing geographical disparity 
between blue-collar jobs and blue-collar homes that are evident to any- 
one who travels between Europe and the United States. In Paris, Milan, 
and Rome, new suburban factory locations are interspersed with high- 
rise apartment developments, many for working-class families, in con- 
trast to the low-density middle-class  subdivisions  that continue to be built 
around U. S. cities. Among the American institutions that foster this 
inefficient and energy-wasting pattern of  development are (1) a lack of 
metropolitan-wide land-use planning; (2) locally controlled restrictive 
zoning that keeps high-density residential developments out of the older 
inner suburbs; (3) the tax-deductibility of residential mortgages; (4) the 
Federal subsidy of interstate highways that have facilitated intrasuburban 
commuting; and (5) racial “steering” by local real estate agents. 
Another uniquely American  phenomenon is the deterioration and 
ultimate abandonment of vast amounts of inner-city real estate, in con- 
trast to the continuing high density of land use within central European 
cities. Housing abandonment is both preceded and accompanied by the 
closing of  commercial establishments in neighborhood shopping strips, 
thus eliminating a natural nearby source of employment for black youths 
and creating negative externalities for the remaining residents of  the 
area. In turn, the problems of  commercial flight and housing abandon- 
ment must be blamed primarily on a phenomenon which is pervasive in 
inner American cities but by contrast is almost unknown in most Euro- 
pean cities: lower-class ghetto crime that simultaneously lowers the rate 
of return on commercial and residential investment and drives out many 
residents who can afford to move. 
Thus at its heart the black employment problem is caused by a mixture 
of perverse local and Federal government policies that foster low-density 
middle-class suburban residential development, and the devastating im- 
pact of lower-class ghetto crime on the location of employment opportu- 
nities and on all other aspects of  economic and social life in the central 
city. A new perspective is gained on the employment problem of  U. S. 
blacks by  contrasting their situation with that of  disadvantaged lower- 
class workers in other countries, and the inevitable conclusion is reached 
that the U. S. situation is unique, has no clear counterpart in other 
nations,  and is  more accurately classified  as a social rather than  an 
economic dilemma. In its analysis of  the recent geographical shift of 
blue-collar employment opportunities in Chicago, a recent article con- 
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These shifts probably do not directly reflect the desire of  industrialists 
and merchants to move their establishments as far as possible from 
Chicago’s black South and West sides. Environmental deterioration 
and the fear of white workers to commute to black areas are probably 
more important explanations than racial discrimination. But the results 
of the shifts are the same. Factory jobs move to the northwest suburbs, 
but black workers cannot follow because of racial and economic seg- 
regation in housing. [McManus, 19791 
Notes 
1. See the expression for the marginal revenue from additional job search in Gordon 
(1973, p. 179, equation A-2). A reduction in the market wage relative to the shadow price of 
home time will  raise marginal revenue relative to marginal cost, and thus extend the 
duration of  job search. If  this approach predicts correctly, a labor force group with an 
increasing share of  supply should experience a higher duration of  unemployment. 
2.  Data sources and further details are provided in Gordon (1977, pp. 199-206). 
3.  For an extended argument that Federal legislation prevents employers from paying 
blacks less to compensate for their lower productivity, see Williams (1979). 
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